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MONDAY EVENING CONVERSATION 
January 26, 1987
"CONTRAGATE: THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW"
The first program event of the Center in 1987 is a Monday Evening Conversation dealing ; 
with the legal issues, the moral dilemmas, and therefore the ethical decisions involved in the * 
United States Government's dealings with Iran and Nicaragua. Professor Robert P. Lawry of i 
the CWRU Law School will lead the discussion. The program is scheduled for 7:30 p.m. in 
the 1914 Lounge of Thwing Student Center on the CWRU campus. We hope you will plan 
on attending this important discussion.
The subject and content of this program reflects a new direction the Center is taking 
with some of its programs in the first half of 1987. This new direction is more fully 
described in the following article.
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THE CENTER'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DESIGNS A NEW PROGRAM FORMAT
FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 1987
Whenever members of the Center gather together, regardless of their professional fields, the conversa­
tion frequently turns to the moral and ethical issues which mark some of the important current events in 
our world. Be it South Africa, Boesky or Iran, these issues do affect our daily lives and challenge our 
personal ethical thinking. Therefore the Executive Committee of the Center is focusing one of the Monday 
Evening Conversations each month around such news-breaking events. The first such Conversation is 
described above.
The Executive Committee is planning two Monday Evening Conversations each month. They will 
usually fall on the first and third Mondays. One of these Conversations will center on a current news issue; 
the other will deal with current ethical issues arising in one or more of the professions. We hope this more 
contemporary approach will better respond to the needs of our members who will be informed of these 
programs through our monthly Newsletter.
Our members should know the Center's Executive Committee is composed of a group of very dedicated 
men and women who are trying very hard to make the Center's activities relevant to its members. The 
Executive Committee members are:
Mark Barr, a recent graduate of the School of Dentistry.
Lisa Bower, a student in the School of Management.
Kate DeVito, a student in the School of Law.
Fr. Ed Kordas, a staff member of the Hallinan Center.
Valerie Rice, a student in the School of Nursing.
Becky Snider, a student in the School of Nursing.
Kari Still, a nurse practitioner at University Hospitals.
Robert W. Clarke, Co-Director of the Center.
Robert P. Lawry, Co-Director of the Center and Professor of Law at CWRU.
Of great importance for the success of the Center is the need for students within each of the schools 
who will work with those members listed above in publicizing the Center within their school. If you are 
interested and time permits helping in this way, contact the person in your school and indicate your willing­
ness and the time you have available.
Further, we are seeking representation from the School of Applied Social Sciences and the School of 
Medicine. Anyone interested should contact Mr. Lawry at 368-2667 or Mr. Clarke at 368-5349.
Finally, if you who are our members have an issue which you feel important for our agenda, please be 
in touch with any of those listed above. The best discussions are held around issues which are affecting 
your life and work.
LAW AND MORALITY
by Robert P. Lawry
Robert P. Lawry, Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University's School of Law, 
teaches the course on Professional Responsibility. We have asked Bob to write on the 
subject of law and morality because a number of people assume that if a certain act is 
"legal" it is therefore "moral" or "ethical." We believe that there is a significant difference 
between these concepts. Further, we want to note the difference between "morality" and 
"ethics." One's morality consists of a range of fundamental beliefs about human life. When 
one acts on these beliefs, one is making an ethical decision based on one's moral foundation.
Law and morality are distinct but interrelated subjects. We expect laws to be just, and therefore 
moral; but we sometimes say a particular law is unjust, i.e., a tax deduction or tax exemption for one group 
over others similarly situated may well be unjust. Indeed a whole system of laws may be unjust. Look at 
the scheme of apartheid in South Africa. So our everyday experience indicates two salient points; (1) laws 
ought to be just or moral, there ought to be a coincidence between the two; and (2) laws are 
not always just or moral, there is sometimes divergence between the two. A third point lurks behind these 
common sense ones, and is important to uncover and stress. The hidden point is: even in situations where 
the law is just, there may be moral obligations that go beyond the pale of the law. For example, the law 
may force me to pay a legally contracted debt; but contract law in the United States does not force me to 
discharge a moral obligation only. So if someone agrees to give me food and lodging for a week in exchange 
for $100, the law would oblige me at the end of the week to give over the money. However, if someone 
simply took me in and cared for me without expecting or bargaining for any monetary return, the law 
would not force me to say so much as a "thank you." Ordinary moral principles, however, would indicate 
that I am indebted to the person who cared for me. The discharge of that obligation may or may not be 
met by the payment of a $100 bill or a genuine expression of gratitude, but something is called for beyond 
what the law would require.
What I have said so far seems to me to be rather straight forward and non-problematic. A tougher 
question awaits us, however. The answer to this question may be inferred from what I have already said, 
but my guess is that without further elucidation, the answer would not be readily forthcoming. The 
question is this: given a law which seems to be particularly relevant to the case at hand, does meeting the 
requirement of that law satisfy our moral obligation on the matter? I assume, of course, that the law in 
question is not considered unjust. If the law were unjust, other complications would arise; but before we 
deal with the more complicated question, let us take a close look at the question just posed. To get a 
handle on it, let me use a hypothetical example. A law is passed in Ohio requiring the use of a device on 
smoke stacks to cut down the pollution caused when large amounts of smoke are discharged into the air. 
The owner of a factory complies. Despite the compliance, animals on adjoining farms are made sick and 
many die from the pollution. Has the factory owner met his moral obligation if he does nothing more? 
Assuming for the sake of my point that the owner can do more at minimal expense to alleviate the harm to 
the nearby animals, it is not hard to construct a convincing moral argument that he must do more, that he 
has a moral obligation to do more. This example is typical of those that people cite when they say of 
another; "he/she is hiding behind the law." Lawyers often are paid large sums of money to allow people to 
do perfectly legal things which are morally bankrupt. Our own ordinary experience tell us that.
Now what sometimes happens in a society like ours in a case of the kind I just described is that an 
injured farmer brings a lawsuit for damages suffered as a result of his cows getting sick or dying. The 
factory owner defends by saying he had installed the device in accordance with the law. Oddly enough, the 
farmer may win, because the judge believes it is morally right that the factory owner compensate the farmer 
for damages he caused and could have avoided by a small expenditure. The judge will apply a general pre­
existing principle like "negligence" to the facts of this case in order to have law and justice coincide.
If you have followed me so far, you have discovered something interesting and important about law. 
Law is not a set of pre-established rules that are used to maintain order and predictability in society. Law is 
partially that, of course; but law is also social morality on the move, changing, adapting, growing to meet the 
unforeseen case. In any given case the law may not change, justice may be thwarted; but the tendency in a 
good society is toward the conservative law moving to encompass justice in new settings and in new ways.
If it is true that obedience to law does not always exhaust one's moral obligation in a matter, is it also 
true that an unjust law does not bind at all? May we, with impunity, simply disobey a law that is unjust? 
This question has caused nightmares for legal philosophers through the years. The answer is complex; and 
in the space allotted me I can only suggest the frame of an answer. First of all, a law can be unjust in
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several different ways. A law may be unjust because it was beyond the power of the lawmaker. Our civil 
rights movement in the sixties involved a challenge to many segregationist laws that were unjust in this 
manner. Another way a law can be unjust is that it burdens one segment of society or favors another 
segment disproportionately. Tax "loopholes” are often seen as examples of these kinds of laws. A third way 
would be for the law itself to be substantively immoral. The fugitive slave laws in the antebellum south are 
examples of these kinds of unjust or immoral laws. My short answer to the question whether there is a 
moral obligation to obey unjust laws is: (1) unjust laws do not bind in conscience, but the problem of 
determining whether any law is unjust is complex indeed and not to be undertaken by any citizen without 
careful thought; but (2) even after careful thought, if the conclusion is that the law is unjust, one should 
still not disobey if others would be led to do evil things as a result of the disobedience. President Nixon 
once argued that the Watergate burglars were led to do what they did because of the acts of law-breaking 
committed by people involved in the civil rights movement. I think Nixon was demonstrably wrong in his 
argument, but it is the kind of argument one has to take seriously. Ghandi once called off a demonstration 
of massive but justified law-breaking in India because a strike had occurred which crippled the State. In his 
view the strike altered the moral character of his otherwise justified law-breaking. Finally, it should be 
stressed that if you are forced by the law to do an evil thing, you must not do it. The early Christians had 
to decline to worship the false gods of Rome; to do otherwise would have amounted to a direct violation of 
the first commandment of God.
All of what I have said cannot be properly understood or assessed unless and until we struggle with the 
question of the definitions of words like law, justice, morality, authority and the like. That struggle is a 
complex one, and I am unable to do more than scratch the surface now. As a teaser, however, I am going 
to offer definitions of law and of morality which I cannot explain or defend in this brief article. First: law 
is a rule of reason for the common good, promulgated by those who have care of a community. This 
definition is ideal, but none the less, more accurate and useful than alternative definitions. Second: morality 
is that fundamental discipline or practice which deals with questions of right and wrong, good and evil, seen 
from the perspective of the total human being. It is my belief that there is a general moral obligation to 
obey the law; but that if a conflict exists between law and morality, one's moral obligation is paramount.
Perhaps I should have offered these definitions at the beginning. I did not because I thought they would 
get in the way of a common sense understanding of law and morality, which operates well enough to under­
stand the distinctions I made in the body of this essay. Much the hardest part of a true understanding 
of the interrelationship between law and morality, however, comes from a meaningful wrestling with the 
definitions of these and related concepts. A good text in Jurisprudence gives a start in understanding these 
words and their meanings. A long life of thought may be necessary before one can be satisfied that he or 
she has got them even approximately right.
BOOK REVIEW
Habits of the Heart
Richard N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, Wm. M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton,
Harpers & Row, 1985.
Michelle B. Creger graduated from Case Western Reserve University Law School and is 
presently an associate in the law firm of McDonaid, Hopkins & Hardy in Cleveland. Because 
we feel that this book contributes greatiy to an understanding of our nation today we asked 
Michelle to share her superior writing abiiity in reviewing this book for our members. We 
thank her and commend this book for your reading.
Habits of the Heart is the product of five years of field interviews by the authors who spoke with over 
200 Middle-class Americans. Throughout the book there are references to the comments, stories and 
reflections of these individuals. From these interviews the authors have created a thoughtful, well-written 
analysis of how Americans make sense of their lives, how they think about themselves, and how their ideas 
relate to their actions.
In this book, the authors describe the nature of American individualism, asking whether individualism, 
as the dominant ideology of American life, is undermining the conditions of its own existence.
The authors examine three traditions in American culture: bibUcai, repubiican^ and individualist. The 
biblical tradition is that brought by the Puritan settlers and subsequent Judeo-Christian immigrants. It 
stresses the inherent goodness of a just and ethical life, the building of a stable community, and attention to 
the spiritual life. Freedom in the biblical tradition is the freedom to do what is morally right.
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The republican tradition focuses on the ideal of a self-governing society of relative equal individuals in 
which all participate. The vision of Thomas Jefferson exemplifies this tradition. Freedom in the republican 
tradition is more than the right to be left alone. It requires the participation of educated and active citizens.
The individualist tradition has two aspects: utilitarian individualism and expressive individualism. In 
utilitarian individualism, the social good automatically emerges from each person pursuing his or her ovvn 
interests. The successful life is achieved by getting ahead on one's own initiative. Ben Franklin s sayings in 
Poor Richard's Almanac are representative of this tradition. For example, "God helps those who help 
themselves." In expressive individualism, the focus is still on the individual, but the successful life is one 
spent cultivating and expressing the self end exploring one's social and cosmic identities. Freedom in this 
tradition is the freedom to express oneself.
The authors elaborate on these traditions throughout the book, emphasizing that these traditions are 
still alive and speak to our present questions. The message of Habits of the Heart is that we have allowed 
individualism to dominate our thinking and that we need to recover the insights of our biblical and
republican traditions. ■ a •
In one sense, the book is a commentary on the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 
In the 1830's, Tocqueville described the mores and traditions-the "habits of the heart"-of the American 
people. He warned that individualism might eventually isolate Americans from each other and undermine the 
conditions of freedom. The authors of Habits of the Heart show how this prediction is becoming a reality.
The book is divided into two parts; private life and public life. In discussing private life, the authors 
explore the themes of biblical, republican and individualist traditions in personal development, marriage 
and friendship. For example, they address the tension between seeing marriage as providing psychological 
gratification (individualist tradition) and seeing marriage as providing people with stable committed 
relationships that tie into the larger society (biblical tradition).
In discussing public life, the authors consider the topics of religion, citizenship and public involvement. 
For example, they point out that we think of our American society in terms of the political economy, i.e., 
government and large corporations, while ignoring our mores, culture and daily practices of life. They 
describe the fragmentariness of our modern culture and the domination of material ambition.
But at the same time, the republican and biblical traditions continue in families, churches and associa­
tions to give meaning to our lives and to create a morally and intellectually intelligible world. The authors 
ask, "is there not the danger that the erosion of these traditions [biblical and republican] may eventually 
deprive us of that meaning altogether?"
The author suggests a social transformation to seek an understanding of what we have in common and 
the goals we seek together, and to link these interests together. Mere procedural changes through political 
consensus are not enough. Rather, a social movement is needed that would, among other things, 1) restore 
the concept of "calling" to the choice of work, 2) minimize the economic rewards/punishments in choosing 
a particular career, 3) replace the language of individualism with the language of the biblical and republican 
traditions, 4) reaffirm the value of education as a way to connect private aspirations with the common 
culture, and 5) emphasize that our common life requires more than the exclusive concern for material
accumulation. • . l, i* ■
The book is valuable to the historian because it connects where we come from with where we are.lt is
important to the philosopher because it looks beyond the structures and practices to the values they 
embody. The book speaks to the social scientist because it describes the experiences and perceptions of real 
people in our society. But most importantly, the book is written for the non expert. In its style and 
message, it offers us an honest and challenging look at ourselves.
BOOK REVIEW
Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education
Nell Noddings; University of California Press, Stanford University, 1984.
Wendy Miano is a graduate of the Case Western Reserve University School of Nursing. After 
several years of full-time nursing, Wendy devoted a period of time as full-time mother. She is 
now employed part-time with Lake County Hospice and University Hospitals cancer unit. 
We appreciate the contribution of her review of a book of importance to all who care about 
their relationships with others.
Nell Noddings opens her thesis of ethical caring in the following paraphrase:
• The relation of natural caring will be identified as the human condition that we, consciously 
or unconsciously, perceive as "good" .. .
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• It is our longing for caring—to be in that special re/af/or?—that provides the motivation for 
us to be moral.
? •It is this ethical ideal, this realistic picture of ourselves as one-caring, that guides us as we
strive to meet the other morally , . .
• We shall not have absolute principles to guide us . . .
• Where there is a principle, there is implied its exception, and too, principles function to 
separate us from each other. . . (p. 5).
It is this position I will define as it unfolds in a fluent, unique perspective on ethics—an ethic of caring.
The view of ethics Noddings offers in this book is a feminine view, rooted in receptivity, relatedness, 
and responsiveness. Noddings purports ethics has been discussed largely in the language of the father, "the 
detached one," in principles and propositions using terms such as justification, fairness, and equity. The 
mother's voice has been silent. And it is a stance that might turn a reader off, raise a defensive voice, and 
block understanding the position Noddings suggests. But Noddings' ideas and thoughts transcend societal 
sexism, are devoid of judgement for or against feminist or masculine views. Rather, it represents an alterna­
tive, one that "begins with the moral attitude and longing for goodness."
I want to define Noddings' ethical stance through examples of her ideal. Noddings suggests that women, 
(and I would argue men are capable of this approach), when faced with a moral dilemma, often ask for 
more information. Women need to talk to the participants, see their eyes and facial expressions, to receive 
what they are feeling. Women can and do give reasons for their actions, but the reasons often reflect 
feelings. Let me illustrate using the issue of abortion. I pick this issue as it is one discussed frequently as a 
moral dilemma. First I reflect on my own pregnancy and secondly, on my action in response to another's.
Operating under the guidance of an ethic of caring, we are not likely to find abortion, in general, either 
right or wrong (p. 87). Noddings defines an "incipient embryo as an 'information speck': a set of control­
ling instruction for a human life; it has no given sanctity" (p. 87).
Suppose the information speck is mine. As "one-caring" I am concerned with human feelings. I am 
deeply aware of this child-to-be as a product of love between a man deeply "cared for" and me. I may wish 
I was not pregnant, but there is already a relatedness. My decision against abortion has been made therefore 
out of natural caring.
But let us consider that this daughter of mine has grown up and it is she who is pregnant and considering 
abortion. She is not certain of her love for the man and is deeply upset about her economic and emotional 
future. I might convey sanctity over this child-to-be; but I am not all-knowing. I am the mother of this 
suffering "cared for." This "information speck" is just an "information speck" and that is all. There is no 
relation. Nonetheless, as this embryo grows, so does the possibility for relatedness. To consider abortion, 
the "one caring" cares first for the one in immediate pain or peril. I do not require everyone, my daughter 
included, to behave as I would in the same situation. This position supporting abortion, likewise is a stance 
of caring. One may disagree with Noddings' definition of a human embryo. However the main point is 
directly related to the caring relation between the "one caring" and the "one cared for."
Noddings describes in great detail her characters, the "one caring" and the one "cared for." Caring for 
the "one caring" involves "a feeling" with the other (p. 30). This is an "engrossment," an empathy that 
receives, communicates with, and works with the other.
For example, a mother (and I would argue, father) naturally feels with their infant. As my baby cries, I 
respond to her and feel something is wrong. This is my infant's feeling and it is mine also. I receive it and 
share it. I may respond to my baby, seeking to comfort her; "I'm here, everthing is all right." From there I 
ask, "What's wrong?" My baby may not respond verbally, but my question and tone invoke her attentive­
ness. This root fosters then, a relation of caring..
The one "cared for" in turn shares in this relatedness. Noddings defines a reciprocity exhibited by the 
one "cared for." The "cared for" responds to "one caring" in some way. There will certainly be differences 
in responsiveness. One child may share with his parent a spontaneity of feelings. Another child may be less 
inclined to share her life fully with her parent. The "one caring" recognizes the difference; the levels of respon­
siveness are accepted for what they are. In this way the parent allows her children freedom as individuals.
To summarize, a caring relation requires the engrossment of the "one caring" and the spontaneous 
response of one "cared for" (p. 78). It is in this context of ethical caring Noddings explores issues of right 
and wrong; joy as an ideal; caring for animals, plants, things, and ideas; and re-structuring moral education. 
Noddings argues that even when caring is not felt (instead the one "cared for" feels absence of caring) there 
is hope that one "cared for" can learn to care and learn to be cared for.
Caring is a book of philosophy and, therefore, not light reading. It assumes no particular knowledge or 
experience in the reader other than having lived awhile. Some parts of the discussion will seem strange, even 
disturbing. But this book will also leave you confirmed and strengthened in that most natural and most 
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’"'t. The Foundations of Bioethics
H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.; Oxford, 1986
We appreciate the contribution of this book review by Dr. Mary Briody Mahowaid, Associate 
Professor of Medical Ethics at CWRU's School of Medicine. Dr. Mahowaid has been closely 
associated with our Center and is Co-Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at CWRU.
In The Foundations of Bioethics, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., describes bioethics during the last two 
decades as "the story of the development of a secular ethic." He then proceeds to elaborate his own version 
of such an ethic for a pluralist society; a Kantian approach which focuses on the meaning of persons as 
moral agents, i.e., individuals who are "rational, able to choose freely according to a rational plan of life," 
and possessed of a notion of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness." Only through persons, says 
Englehardt, can a moral or "peaceable community" come into being.
The author is both philosopher and physician at Baylor School of Medicine, and member of the 
National Advisory Committee for CWRU's new Center for Biomedical Ethics. To his credit, Engelhardt 
carries through on his starting emphasis, even where this leads to rather disturbing conclusions. For example, 
he supports the view that parents may refuse life-sustaining treatment for defective newborns (e.g., Bloom­
ington's Baby Doe), and argues for a definition of death as cessation of neocortical function. The latter 
position implies that Karen Quinlan was in fact dead during the ten years in which she breathed on her 
own, while lacking capacity for cognitive function.
Of the two crucial principles of bioethics, autonomy and beneficence, autonomy is paramount so long 
as we are dealing with persons. When we are dealing with non-persons, e.g., animals, fetuses, infants, the 
profoundly retarded, and those permanently comatose, our moral obligations are based on beneficence, or 
on respect for the autonomy of others who are persons. Although suicide, assisting suicide, and active volun­
tary euthanasia are morally acceptable options, the right to health care (even minimal health care) is not a 
universal right. Inequities that exist among us, according to Engelhardt, are unfortunate, but not unfair.
Inequities in delivery of health care might nonetheless be reduced through the virtue of liberty, i.e., the 
generosity of free individuals. Other "cardinal virtues" of Engelhardt's secular ethics are tolerance and 
prudence. Taken together, these virtues support diverse interpretations of "the good life" within the moral 
constraints of reason and authority. While endorsing pluralism, Engelhardt considers his own conclusions 
''intellectually unavoidable to even the most committed Christian, Jew, Hindu, Buddhist or Communist, 
who does not wish to use force to receive moral disputes."
BOOK REVIEW
